Anti–SARS-CoV Immunoglobulin G in Healthcare Workers, Guangzhou, China by Chen, Wei-Qing et al.
To determine the prevalence of inapparent infection
with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) among
healthcare workers, we performed a serosurvey to test for
immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibodies to the SARS coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) among 1,147 healthcare workers in 3 hospi-
tals that admitted SARS patients in mid-May 2003. Among
them were 90 healthcare workers with SARS. As a refer-
ence group, 709 healthcare workers who worked in 2 hos-
pitals that never admitted any SARS patients were similarly
tested. The seroprevalence rate was 88.9% (80/90) for
healthcare workers with SARS and 1.4% (15/1,057) for
healthcare workers who were apparently healthy. The sero-
prevalence in the reference group was 0.4% (3/709). These
findings suggest that inapparent infection is uncommon.
Low level of immunity among unaffected healthcare work-
ers reinforces the need for adequate personal protection
and other infection control measures in hospitals to prevent
future epidemics. 
O
n January 2, 2003, a patient was admitted to the
Traditional Medicine Hospital, Guangdong
Province, with fever, cough, decreased leukocyte count,
and abnormal chest radiographs. Shortly after the patient
was admitted, 7 healthcare workers who cared for him
became ill with similar symptoms. This index patient was
retrospectively confirmed to be the first patient with
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Guangzhou
(1). Subsequently, outbreaks of SARS occurred in sever-
al hospitals (2), and the disease rapidly spread to the
Guangzhou community (1). In mid-February, the inci-
dence of SARS reached a peak and gradually declined
thereafter. When the last case was reported on May 9,
2003, a total of 1,284 probable SARS cases had been
reported in Guangzhou (3). 
In most cases, the disease was spread through close
contact with an infected person (4). A high incidence of
SARS was observed among healthcare workers, especial-
ly during the early stages of the SARS epidemic (5–8);
healthcare workers were likely exposured to the SARS
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) at the workplace. Also, SARS-
CoV can survive for many hours on environmental sur-
faces (5); therefore, infection through contact with
contaminated fomites is a distinct possibility, despite the
absence of supportive epidemiologic evidence. Aseries of
strict preventive measures, including specially designed
wards to accommodate SARS patients and the use of
gloves, eye protection, face masks, foot covers, and pro-
tective gowns, were adopted to control the spread of
SARS to healthcare workers. Whether inapparent infec-
tions existed with this new epidemic was unclear. In this
study, we explored the seroprevalence of antibodies to
SARS-CoV in healthcare workers who had cared
for SARS patients but did not have SARS and those
working in hospitals with no SARS patients. We also
determined the seroprevalence of antibodies to SARS-
CoV in  convalescent healthcare workers in whom SARS
was diagnosed. 
Methods
Study Populations
In mid-May 2003, ≈4 months after the initial SARS out-
break in Guangzhou, a cross-sectional survey was carried
out on healthcare workers who worked with SARS patients
in the First, Second, and Third Affiliated Hospitals of the
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Administrative Region, People’s Republic of China had occurred among healthcare workers in the Second and
Third Affiliated Hospitals but not the First Affiliated
Hospital. Of the 1,394 healthcare workers who cared for
SARS patients in these 3 hospitals, 1,147 (82.3%) were sur-
veyed. Those surveyed included healthcare workers from
all departments that cared for SARS patients. All healthcare
workers on duty were surveyed; only those who were off-
duty during the survey were excluded.
For comparison, 709 healthcare workers were sampled
from 2 hospitals with no SARS patients: the Affiliated
Cancer Hospital, Guangzhou, where no SARS patients
were admitted, and the Fifth Affiliated Hospital, Zhuhai,
where no SARS cases were reported in the community. A
total of 1,856 healthcare workers were surveyed.
Serum Collection and Interview
For each healthcare worker, 10 mLof peripheral venous
blood was collected; the serum was separated and stored at
–70°C. A standardized interview with a structured ques-
tionnaire was used to obtain information on sociodemo-
graphic characteristics and the history of SARS according
to a case definition of SARS by the Ministry of Health,
China (9).
A probable case-patient was defined as one who had
close contact with a patient, was a member of an infected
cluster, or infected other persons; had symptoms and signs
of febrile respiratory symptoms, and had changes on chest
radiograph. Apatient was also considered to have a proba-
ble case if he or she visited or lived in an area where SARS
was reported with secondary transmission within 2 weeks
of illness onset, had symptoms and signs of febrile respi-
ratory illness, had normal or decreased leukocyte count,
and had changes on chest radiograph.
A suspected case-patient was defined as one who had
close contact with a patient; was a member of an infected
cluster, or infected other persons; and had symptoms and
signs of febrile respiratory illness; and had normal or
decreased leukocyte count. A patient was also considered
to have a suspected case if he or she visited or lived in an
area where SARS was reported with secondary transmis-
sion within 2 weeks of illness onset, had symptoms and
signs of febrile respiratory illness, and had changes on
chest radiograph. If a patient had no epidemiologic link to
SARS but he or she had symptoms and signs of febrile res-
piratory illness, normal or decreased leukocyte count, and
changes on chest radiograph, he or she was still considered
to have a suspected case.
Aperson who had visited or lived in cities where SARS
cases were reported with secondary transmission was
placed under medical observation if he or she had symp-
toms and signs of febrile respiratory illness and had a nor-
mal or decreased leukocyte count.
Detecting Serum IgG against SARS-CoV
Immunoglobulin (Ig) G against SARS-CoV were
detected by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
according to the manufacturer’s instructions (Beijing BGI-
GBI Biotech Co., Ltd.) (10). This ELISA has a sensitivity
of 89.9% and a specificity of 99.0% (11). 
Statistical Analysis
Means and standard deviations were used to describe
continuous variables. Proportions and prevalence rates
were used to describe categorical variables. Chi-square
tests were performed to test the association between
SARS-CoV IgG seropositivity and the sociodemographic
characteristics of the healthcare workers.
Results
Sociodemographic Characteristics
The mean age of the healthcare workers investigated
was 30.78 years (SD 9.1 years); 71.6% were women.
Details of their sociodemographic characteristics are pre-
sented in Table 1. General information related to SARS in
the 5 hospitals is shown in Table 2.
Prevalence of IgG against SARS-CoV among
Healthcare Workers
Among healthcare workers working with SARS
patients, the prevalence of IgG against SARS-CoV was
88.9% (80/90) for those who contracted SARS and 1.4%
(15/1,057) for those who did not (Table 3). By contrast, the
seroprevalence was 0.5% (2/371) for healthcare workers
working in the non-SARS hospital in Guangzhou and
0.3% (1/338) for healthcare workers in the hospital in
SARS-free Zhuhai. The overall seroprevalence in this ref-
erence group of healthcare workers was 0.4% (3/709).
We also compared the prevalence of anti-SARS IgG in
healthcare workers for each sociodemographic characteris-
tic. We analyzed the data on healthcare workers who
worked with SARS patients in the 3 hospitals. These
results are presented in Table 4.
The results showed that the seroprevalence of anti-
SARS IgG in healthcare workers <26 years of age was sig-
nificantly higher than in those >26 years of age (p < 0.05).
Women had a higher seroprevalence than men (p < 0.01).
Those with a senior school or technical secondary school
education had a higher seroprevalence than those with ter-
tiary education. Seroprevalence was highest among health-
care workers working in departments of respiratory
diseases, followed by those in departments of infectious
diseases, then in intensive care units; the prevalence was
<10% in all remaining departments (p < 0.001). No labo-
ratory personnel had IgG against SARS. When healthcare
workers were compared to those with senior positions,
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by SARS-CoV (p < 0.01).
Discussion
Anti-SARS IgG can be detected 1–2 weeks after the
onset of symptoms. Almost all SARS patients in the con-
valescent stage had anti-SARS IgG in their serum samples
(11–14). In our study, all healthcare workers with SARS
were in the convalescent stage, and SARS-CoV infected
most while they were caring for the same index patient
who was subsequently identified as a superspreader (15).
The finding of a 100% seroprevalence of SARS IgG
among 17 SARS-infected healthcare workers in the Third
Affiliated Hospital was identical to the results by Li et al.
(12), who tested SARS IgG at different stages among the
same group of SARS-infected healthcare workers by using
the same ELISA. By contrast, 63 (86.3%) of 73 healthcare
workers with SARS in the Second Affiliated Hospital were
seropositive for SARS IgG. Some of these healthcare
workers might have been misdiagnosed, as the clinical
diagnosis of SARS was not specific (16). Even allowing
for this possibility, the overall high seropositivity rate of
88.9% among SARS patients is similar to findings by
Wang et al. in Beijing, who used the same test (11); Chow
et al. in Singapore, who used a different EIA (17); and
Chan et al. in Hong Kong, who used an immunofluores-
cence assay (18). All of these studies indicate that serum
IgG antibodies to SARS-CoV at the convalescent stage of
the illness can be useful in confirming the disease. 
The low seroprevalence o SARS IgG (0.3%–2.8%) in
healthy healthcare workers with different levels of expo-
sure to SARS patients is similar to that reported by Wang
et al. (11). However, a similar study by Chow et al. in
Singapore did not find any serologic evidence of subclini-
cal infection among a population with a high likelihood of
exposure to the virus. Our ELISA was 99% specific (11).
This specificity could have produced a few false-positive
results, which accounts for a low seropositive rate of 0.4%
(3/709) among healthcare workers in the reference group,
who had no exposure to SARS in their hospitals. One
healthcare worker in Zhuhai, where no SARS occurred,
was seropositive, which could be a false-positive result.
However, we could not exclude the possibility of inappar-
ent infection among healthcare workers in the 4 hospitals
in Guangzhou. Another possibility is cross-reaction with
other human coronaviruses. A more specific test, such as
the indirect immunofluorescence test, should clarify this
uncertainty (18). 
The low seroprevalence of SARS IgG, at 1.4%
(15/1,057) among apparently healthy frontline healthcare
workers in all 3 SARS hospitals, suggests that inapparent
infection is relatively uncommon. We did not, however,
ascertain whether the healthcare workers with a positive
antibody test result were carriers of SARS-CoV. Overall,
the low seropositivity among healthy healthcare workers
suggests that the level of immunity to SARS in the gener-
al population in Guangzhou was too low to constitute an
effective immune barrier against the spread of SARS.
Should the disease recur there, every effort should be made
to protect healthcare workers and the general public from
being infected by SARS patients. 
The First Affiliated Hospital only admitted SARS
patients after outbreaks had occurred among healthcare
workers in the Second and Third Affiliated Hospitals. After
these outbreaks, a series of protective measures were
adopted in all 3 hospitals. Sufficient preparation, such as
personal protection and designated SARS wards, is impor-
tant to avert hospital outbreaks. The low seroprevalence of
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Affiliated Hospital indicated the effectiveness of these
measures. This finding is consistent with the study by
Chow et al. (17).
The seroprevalence rates were significantly different
among the healthcare workers who cared for SARS
patients when classified by their age, sex, educational
level, hospital, department, and job title. These differences
could be due to the probability of exposure to the SARS
index case. On January 30, 2003, the index patient was
admitted to the Department of Respiratory Diseases of the
Second Affiliated Hospital. On February 1, he was trans-
ferred to the Third Affiliated Hospital because of worsen-
ing dyspnea. During his stay in these 2 hospitals, where
protective measures were lacking, he directly and indirect-
ly infected 90 healthcare workers and 22 healthcare work-
ers in the Second and Third Affiliated Hospitals,
respectively. This finding accounts for the much higher
seroprevalence of SARS IgG among healthcare workers in
the departments of respiratory diseases and infectious dis-
eases. Healthcare workers in SARS wards and fever clin-
ics were fully equipped with personal protective measures
(caps, gowns, multilayered cotton face masks, eye shields,
gloves, and foot covers), which might explain their much
lower seroprevalence. None of our laboratory healthcare
workers, who performed serologic tests but not live viral
tests, were seropositive, which suggests that the probabili-
ty of SARS infection by handling serum samples of SARS
patients was low. Of all occupations, healthcare attendants
had the highest seropositive rate, which might be related to
their general lower level of education and a lack of train-
ing in infection control measures. Future efforts to
improve SARS containment should also address this prob-
lem among nonprofessional staff. 
This study has several limitations. Even though the
response rate among healthcare workers who cared for
SARS patients was high (82.3%), some selection bias is
inevitable. Moreover, the study was limited to 5 university
hospitals, so we caution against the extrapolation of our
findings to healthcare workers in other hospitals and to the
general population. We have not tested serum samples
from our healthcare workers against other pathogens, e.g.,
Mycoplasma pneumoniae and influenza virus, which lim-
its our ability to exclude the nonspecific and atypical pneu-
monia caused by these agents (16).
In conclusion, this study shows that a high proportion
of healthcare workers who have contracted SARS have
IgG against SARS-CoV in their serum samples after they
have fully recovered. Inapparent infection with SARS is
uncommon. The low seropositivity against SARS among
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patients suggests a lack of immunity in this group and in
the general population, where the number of SARS cases
is comparatively small.
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